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INTRODUCTION

the Survey period, numerous cases were decided by

Texas courts applying state and federal environmental laws. The
disputes varied from Clean Air Act cases, to continuing litigation
in the Aviall series of decisions, to other statutory claims, as well as contract and tort suits. Finally a decision, in a dispute between a permitted
facility and neighboring landowners, who entered into a settlement agreement regarding a contested permit, provides interesting insights into how
one should draft such settlement agreements. Further, Texas courts continued to hear a variety of important statutory, contract and tort cases in
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environmental law from which practioners can draw guidance when counseling clients, drafting agreements, and representing parties in litigation.
II.

CLEAN AIR ACT

2
In Blue Skies Alliance v. Texas Commission on EnvironmentalQuality,
the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered challenges from two environmental groups to a flexible air permit for an 800-megawatt pulverized
coal power plant in McLennan County. One group, Texans Protecting
Our Water, Environment and Natural Resources (TPOWER), claimed
that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) erred in
issuing the permit, alleging that no contribution to ozone in nonattainment areas is allowed and that the plant would increase ozone in the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) nonattainment area. Ozone is not a direct
emission but is formed by the reaction of a number of precursors, such as
volatile organic chemicals (VOCs) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), under certain circumstances. 3 The court of appeals noted that under rules issued
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), no single source of
VOCs is presumed to "cause or contribute to ozone exceedences." 4 Further, the TCEQ modeling guidelines provide that "[i]f a source is NOxdominated, then local ozone impacts will be insignificant." 5 The court of
appeals reasoned that both the EPA and the TCEQ reasonably allow "extremely low levels of ozone precursors to flow into an ozone nonattainment area" without violating air quality rules. 6
TPOWER also claimed that the plant's contribution of ozone to the
DFW area, less than 0.03 parts per billion (ppb), was not insignificant.
TPOWER alleged that DFW officials and businesses would be saddled
with the cost of offsetting the plant's emissions, but the court of appeals
noted that TPOWER did not provide "any evidence of the cost of procuring a less than 0.03 ppb ozone reduction."7 Similarly, TPOWER alleged
that health in the DFW area would be negatively affected, but it failed to
introduce evidence of the effect of an increase in ozone of less than 0.03
ppb. The TCEQ, however, found that the "incremental effect on DFW
ozone levels would be approximately 0.04 percent of the 8-hour ozone"
standard, far less than the one-percent level defined as insignificant for
other criteria pollutants.8 Thus the court of appeals declined to secondguess the TCEQ's determination without evidence from TPOWER of the
impact of the potential increase in ozone. 9
Environmental Defense, Inc. (EDI) brought the second challenge, alleging that the best available control technology (BACT) analysis for the

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

283 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.).
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 530-31.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 532.
Id.
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plant should have included an evaluation of the integrated gasification/
combined cycle (IGCC) process.10 In the IGCC process, electricity is
generated by burning gases extracted from coal as opposed to burning the
coal. The court of appeals reviewed the definition of BACT and concluded that the analysis required consideration of the "control technologies that can be applied to the proposed major source"" and that BACT
analysis did not require consideration of control technologies that would
require a redesign of the facility.12 Further, in response to a certified
question from administrative law judges over the contested case hearing
for this permit, the TCEQ executive director explained that "IGCC
would require a redesign of the proposed facility and thus, would be
outside the scope of a BACT analysis."' 3
EDI argued that IGCC must be considered under the BACT analysis
as a clean-fuel technology, but EDI did not argue that IGCC would not
require a redesign of the plant. The court of appeals reasoned, however,
that the clean-fuels provision had to be limited to clean-fuel technologies
capable of application to the proposed facility, because otherwise, IGCC
would have to be considered for every type of energy-producing facility,
whether a coal plant, wind plant, or nuclear plant.14 Because the BACT
analysis applies only to technologies capable of application to the proposed source, and because EDI did not offer evidence that IGCC could
be applied to the proposed plant, the court of appeals found that the
IGCC evidence from EDI was irrelevant.15
III.

SOLID WASTE AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

The latest decision in the Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries,
LLC saga makes it clear that a party seeking cost recovery under section
107 of CERCLA16 cannot cure a failure to allow public participation during a remedial investigation with a later opportunity to provide comments
or with a TCEQ Innocent Owner Certificate (JOC).1 7 Aviall sought to
recover costs under section 107 from Cooper for investigation and
remediation of a number of properties, including one at Love Field in
Dallas. To recover under section 107, a party must comply with the National Contingency Plan (NCP), including the public participation requirement that foreseeably affected parties be allowed a meaningful
opportunity to participate in the remedial investigation.1 8 By February
1997, Aviall's investigation had uncovered contamination at the Love
10. Id. at 533.
11. Id. at 535.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 536.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 536-37.
16. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2006)).
17. No. 3:97-CV-1926-D, 2009 WL 498133, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2009).
18. Id. at *1, *4.
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Field property and at the adjacent Bachman Lake Park. Aviall had also
demonstrated that the groundwater flow was toward twelve adjacent
properties. Because of the properties' proximity to known contamination, and the direction of groundwater flow, the Northern District of
Texas found that the twelve landowners were foreseeably affected parties
even without detected contamination on the twelve properties. 19 In June
2007, Aviall completed its remedial investigation; however, the twelve
downgradient landowners were not notified until November 2007. Because Aviall completed the remedial investigation before it provided notice to the twelve landowners, the court found that Aviall had not
complied with the NCP. 2 0
Aviall contended, however, that it provided an opportunity for meaningful participation, despite the tardy notification. First, Aviall stated that
it offered to obtain an IOC at its cost for each of the twelve downgradient
owners. The court, however, found that an IOC was not equivalent to the
opportunity to comment on, and possibly influence, a remedial investigation. 21 Additionally, Aviall stated that even though the remedial investigation was complete at the time the landowners were notified, it still
would have considered any landowner's request for additional investigation. Aviall, however, did not offer any evidence that the landowners
knew of the opportunity. The court further found that the notice letters
actually gave the impression that the remedial investigation was closed
and not subject to further input.22 The court also generally rejected the
idea that public participation is not required at the remedial investigation
stage if a later opportunity for participation is provided. 23 The Aviall decision demonstrates the importance for parties conducting cleanups to
take a broad view of the scope of foreseeably affected parties and provide
an opportunity to participate as early as possible if the parties seek cost
recovery.
Another case concerned the issue of the knowledge of a release and
how it affects liability under CERCLA of a party that arranges for the
disposal of a hazardous substance. 24 The U.S. Supreme Court recently
held that mere knowledge that a process may result in a release is not
sufficient on its own to establish CERCLA arranger liability. 25 In Celanese Corp. v. Coastal Water Authority, the Southern District of Texas
considered the converse, i.e., whether a lack of knowledge of a release
precludes a finding of arranger liability under CERCLA and the Texas
Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA). 26 Celanese involved a release of
methanol from a pipeline that ruptured during construction of a under19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
981717
25.
26.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
See generally Celanese Corp. v. Coastal Water Auth., No. H-06-2265, 2009 WL
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2009).
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1873 (2009).
2009 WL 981717, at *1.
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ground water pipeline. Celanese sought cost recovery under CERCLA
and the TSWDA from both Eby, the construction contractor for the
water pipeline, and Brown & Root, the engineer that oversaw the design
and construction of the pipeline project. At trial, a jury found that an
unknown Eby employee, operating a backhoe, damaged the methanol
pipeline. The jury also found that the Eby employee did not know what
he had hit, and that neither Eby, nor Brown & Root, nor their employees
knew of the damage to the methanol pipeline.
The court noted that arranger liability under both CERCLA and the
TSWDA required proof of a "nexus between the defendant's conduct and
the disposal of the hazardous substance" after consideration of the totality of the circumstances in each case. 27 The court concluded that a lack of
28 In
knowledge can defeat a claim of arranger liability in a given case.
the present case, the court concluded that neither Eby nor Brown & Root
qualified as arrangers based on the lack of any knowledge of either the
release or the conditions causing the release. 29
In another case, the appellee, Kelsoe, submitted an application to the
TCEQ for the issuance of a solid-waste landfill permit,30 which the
TCEQ executive director determined was administratively incomplete on
December 9, 2005.31 "Kelsoe filed a motion to overturn that decision on
January 3, 2006, and that motion was overruled by operation of law on
January 23, 2006."32 Kelsoe filed suit in Travis County district court on
March 2, 2006, challenging the TCEQ's determination that the application was incomplete. The agency then filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Kelsoe's petition was filed too late to invoke the court's
jurisdiction. 33
The trial court determined that Kelsoe was entitled to an additional
notice of deficiency and reversed the TCEQ's determination that the application was incomplete. 34 The TCEQ appealed to the Austin Court of
Appeals, 35 and the court of appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed
Kelsoe's suit as untimely filed. 36
The court of appeals first noted that under section 361.321(a) of the
Texas Health and Safety Code and section 5.351 of the Texas Water Code,
a person affected by a decision of the TCEQ may appeal to the district
court no "later than the 30th day after the date of the ruling, order, decision, or other act."37 Kelsoe argued that the thirty-day deadline did not
27. Id. at *4-5.
28. Id. at *5.
29. Id.
30. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality v. Kelsoe, 286 S.W.3d 91, 93 (Tex. App.-Austin
2009, pet. denied).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 94.
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apply, because TCEQ's decision to return his application as incomplete
was not a final and appealable agency action, and because the thirty-day
deadline applies only to actions of the TCEQ, not those of the executive
director of the TCEQ. The court of appeals rejected both of these arguments and held that a person seeking judicial review of the executive director's decision to return an application as administratively incomplete
must file an appeal within thirty days as required under section 361.321 of
the Texas Health and Safety Code and section 5.351 of the Texas Water
Code.38
Kelsoe also argued that his motion to overturn the decision extended
the thirty-day deadline. In support, Kelsoe cited to TCEQ rules regarding motions to overturn. 39 The court of appeals noted that the agency's
rules on motions to overturn apply only to applications declared to be
administratively complete. The court of appeals concluded that the
TCEQ's rule, regarding the executive director's determination of whether
an application is administratively complete do not allow for a motion to
overturn.40 Thus, the deadline for filing his appeal was January 9, 2006,
thirty days after the executive director returned Kelsoe's application as
incomplete. 41 Kelsoe establishes that a party seeking to review the executive director's determination that a permit application is administratively
incomplete must file an appeal in court within thirty days of the decision
and cannot rely on a motion to overturn to extend the deadline.
IV. CLEAN WATER ACT
A challenge to a permit issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(the Corps) under section 404 of the Clean Water Act arose as a result of
wetlands filling. 42 The permit would have authorized the dredge and fill
of approximately four acres of wetlands on the west end of Galveston
Island in connection with the construction of a housing development.
The permit, however, was challenged by a number of environmental
groups, primarily on the basis that the Corps failed to "properly analyze
cumulative impacts of the proposed ... development and other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions." 43
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations,
federal agencies are required to consider cumulative impacts. 44 The Fifth
Circuit requires that a cumulative impacts study must identify:
(1) the area in which effects of the proposed project will be felt; (2)
the impacts that are expected in that area from the proposed project;
(3) other actions that ... have had or are expected to have impacts in
38. Id. at 95-96.
39. Id. at 96.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Galveston Beach to Bay Pres. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. G-07-0549, 2009
WL 689884, at *1-2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2009).
43. Id. at *3.
44. Id. at *6 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7)).
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the same area; (4) the impacts or expected impacts from these other
actions; and (5) the overall impact that can be expected if the indi45
vidual impacts are allowed to accumulate.
The environmental groups argued that the Corps failed to consider the
cumulative environmental impacts of another development planned to be
constructed adjacent to the permitted development, the safety impacts of
additional boat traffic resulting from the permitted development, the
"overall impact . . . if the individual impacts are allowed to accumulate,"
and the cumulative effects of the planned development and the existing
developments on the west end of Galveston Island. 46
The Southern District of Texas rejected the environmental groups'
challenges under their first three theories, noting that the administrative
record showed that the Corps had considered the effects of planned developments and that the Corps was entitled to significant deference regarding its conclusions. 47 But the court remanded the case on the final
issue, ruling that the Corps's significance analysis did not sufficiently support a conclusion that the cumulative impacts were not significant, which
left open the question of whether a comprehensive regional assessment
was necessary. 48
The court focused on the Corps's statements in its Environmental Assessment (EA) that the west end of Galveston Island had suffered a "dramatic loss of wetlands and aquatic habitat" and that "the cumulative
impacts to both freshwater and saltwater wetlands and tidal flats have
been substantial." 4 9 The Corps also stated that Galveston Island's remaining upland prairie habitat "may experience an adverse cumulative
impact."5 0 The court could not reconcile these statements with the
Corps's conclusion that the cumulative impacts were not significant.5 1
The court noted that under NEPA, the agency must "articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made." 52 The court went on to describe
the Corps's analysis of cumulative impacts to be "too brief and too conclusory for the court to understand" in light of its statements in the EA.5 3
The court remanded the case and directed the Corps to correct the deficiencies in its significance analysis. 54
45. Id. (citing Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985), overruled
on other grounds, Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 678 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1992)).
46. Id. at *8-10.
47. Id. at *8-10, *12.
48. Id. at *12.
49. Id. at *11.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *12.
52. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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This case reinforces the principle that courts will generally give federal
agencies a high degree of deference to determine whether any particular
environmental impact rises to the level of significance. But even under
such deference, agencies still must provide a rationale and explanation
for their conclusions, and failure to do so leaves the door open for a procedural challenge to the contemplated federal action.
V.

OIL POLLUTION ACT

In United States v. Viking Resources, Inc. 55 the Southern District of
Texas considered a number of issues, including the corporate veil piercing
analysis in a federal Oil Pollution Act (OPA)5 6 case, and the adequacy of
affidavit testimony to support a summary judgment motion on removal
costs and natural resources damages. Two of the most important issues
decided in the case, however, are the scope of "facility" under the OPA
and the right to have a jury determine removal costs and natural resource
damages under the OPA.
In Viking Resources, the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), EPA, Texas Railroad Commission
(RCC), and Texas General Land Office sought cost recovery and natural
resource damages under the OPA for a 2004 oil spill in Galveston
County. The oil spill originated from a tank battery and flowed into a
wetland adjacent to a bayou. Viking Resources, Inc. (Viking) was the
"last known lessee and operator of a subdivided portion of the ... [1]ease
underlying the land where the old tank battery was located."5 7
The OPA imposes strict liability for removal costs and damages on the
responsible party for a facility from which oil is discharged into or upon
navigable waters or adjoining shorelines.5 8 All parties agreed that the
tank battery qualified as a facility but disagreed over whether Viking
owned the tank battery. As an alternative to proving that Viking owned
the tank battery, the government asserted that the applicable facility in
this case extended to all oil-related equipment and structures within the
boundaries of Viking's lease. The court, however, found that OPA's definition of "responsible party" did not allow such a broad interpretation. 5 9
The court pointed out that the definition of responsible party distinguished between onshore and offshore facilities. 60 "For onshore facilities
'any person owning or operating the facility' is a responsible party." 61
"[F]or offshore facilities . . . 'the lessee .. . permittee .. .or the holder of a
right of use and easement ... for the area in which the facility is located is
55. 607 F. Supp. 2d 808 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
56. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
57. Viking Res., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
58. Id. at 815.
59. Id. at 818.
60. Id. at 817.
61. Id.
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the responsible party." 62 The court reasoned that because Congress
chose not to use area as a criterion for defining the responsible party for
an onshore facility, the Government could not expand the scope of facility in this case beyond the tank battery. 63 The court therefore held that
the Government had to prove that Viking owned the tank battery itself.M
The interpretation of a narrow scope of onshore facility in OPA cases is
significant. Under this decision, a current oil and gas lessee should not be
liable under the OPA for a previously abandoned onshore facility merely
by virtue of the lease. Presumably this would apply not only to tank batteries, but also to wells, pits, and other areas from which a release might
occur. Further, for a party acquiring a lease, it may be prudent to clearly
identify in a lease what structures and improvements are included with
the lease or to specifically exclude certain structures or improvements
from the lease.
The second issue of particular interest in Viking Resources was an issue
of first impression: whether a defendant has a right to have a jury determine removal costs and natural resource damages under the OPA. Because the OPA does not provide a right to trial by jury, the court
examined application of the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 65 The application turns on whether the issue in a claim is more legal
or more equitable in nature, since the Seventh Amendment preserves the
right to a jury trial on legal issues but not for equitable claims. 66
Although the issue had not been analyzed under the OPA, the court
analogized it to existing CERCLA case law. 6 7 The court pointed out that
courts have consistently found that response costs under CERCLA are
essentially restitution, which is an equitable remedy. 68 Further, a suit for
removal costs under the OPA had been held to be an equitable action,
although not in the context of determining the right to a jury trial. 69
Based on these cases, the court held that recovery of removal costs under
the OPA is an equitable remedy, and thus, Viking was not entitled to a
jury trial on this issue. 70
On the other hand, the court found that at least one aspect of natural
resource damages under the OPA is legal in nature.7 1 Calculation of natural resource damages under the OPA includes addition of "(1) 'the cost
of restoring, rehabilitating,

. .

. or acquiring the equivalent of, the dam-

aged natural resources,' (2) 'the diminution in value of those natural resources pending restoration,' and (3) 'the reasonable cost of assessing
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

817-18.
818.
828.
829, 831.
829.
830.
832.
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those damages.'" 7 2 The court reasoned that compensation for the diminution in value of natural resources is similar to compensating a plaintiff
for injury to property based on nuisance or trespass, both classic legal
causes of action. 73 Although other components of a natural resource
damage may be equitable, the right to a jury trial is triggered by a single
legal component. 74 In the present case, the judge decided to have the
entire case tried by a jury, whose verdict would be binding on all legal
issues and advisory on the remaining equitable issues.75
VI.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) became the focus of a
lawsuit over a planned reservoir in East Texas in City of Dallas v. Hall.7 6
In 1961, the State of Texas identified a site on the Upper Neches River in
East Texas as a "potential reservoir to serve the growing Dallas/Ft. Worth
Metroplex." 7 7 In 1985, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) identified
the same site as a possible wildlife refuge. In 2004, the FWS prepared an
Environmental Assessment (EA) for the proposed wildlife refuge. The
result of the EA was a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), eliminating the need for the FWS to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 78 The alternatives identified in the EA, other than the noaction alternative, would prohibit the construction of a reservoir on the
site.
In 2006, the FWS designated the boundaries of the wildlife refuge and
accepted the first conservation easement within the refuge. 79 In early
2007, the City of Dallas (the City) and the Texas Water Development
Board (TWDB) filed suit in federal district court, arguing that "the EA
was flawed, that the FWS should have prepared an EIS, and that the
[creation of the wildlife] refuge violated the Tenth Amendment."8 0 At
the time of the suit, neither the City nor the TWDB had taken any action
to create the reservoir or begun initial feasibility and environmental studies of the site. 8 '
The Northern District Court of Texas dismissed the City's and the
TWDB's constitutional claims and granted a motion for partial summary
judgment in favor of the FWS. 8 2 The court held that an EIS was not
needed, because "the establishment of the acquisition boundary did not
cause any change in the physical environment." 8 3 The court further held
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 830-31 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A)).
Id. at 832.
Id.
Id.
562 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 715.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that "the refuge's effect on the City's water supply was speculative and
not within the scope of NEPA."84
The case was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court held that the EA prepared by the FWS complied with
NEPA.8 5 The court rejected the City's and TWDB's argument that the
FWS improperly declined to consider impacts of the refuge on the possible future construction of the reservoir. 86 The court noted that "[t]he
City and TWDB never committed to constructing the reservoir and may
have never done so," and "never [took] any concrete steps toward constructing the reservoir, such as seeking permits, acquiring property, or
commencing any of the hydrological, fiscal, or environmental studies necessary to a major public works project."87 Because of the high level of
''uncertainty over whether the reservoir [would have been] constructed
and its impact on water supplies,

. .

. the effects of establishing the [wild-

life] refuge on water supplies [was] not concrete enough . .. to regulate
that they be included in the EA."88 The court also rejected the City's and
the TWDB's argument that the FWS's decision-making process was a
sham. 89 The court noted that that "FWS engaged in an extensive process
of public education and public comment." 90 The court further stated that
NEPA did not "require an agency to insinuate itself into state planning
92
processes." 9 ' Thus, the court concluded that the EA was adequate.
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the City's and the TWDB's argument
that an EIS was necessary. 93 Citing Sabine River Authority v. U.S. Department of Interior, the court held that the acceptance of an "easement
which prohibits development does not result in the requisite 'change' to
the physical environment" to require an EIS. 9 4 The court further rejected the City's and the TWDB's constitutional challenge because those
issues were not properly raised on appeal. 9 5
Hall establishes that speculative future development need not be considered by federal agencies in the NEPA process. Thus, entities proposing future development should take concrete steps toward such
development to ensure that the effects of a proposed federal action on
the development are considered. This is particularly important in connection with large public works projects with long-term horizons, such as reservoirs and transportation infrastructure projects.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

719-20.
722.
718-19.
719.
719-20.
720-21.
720.
721.
722.
723.
721 (citing 951 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1992)).
723.
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SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT

In a uranium mining case under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),
Goliad County (the County) alleged that the Uranium Energy Corporation (UEC) failed to properly plug and seal numerous exploratory
boreholes and allowed storm water to enter the boreholes, resulting in
contamination of an aquifer. 9 6 The County argued that UEC thereby
"converted" the exploratory boreholes into injection wells without obtaining the required permits. 97 The County brought a citizen suit under
the SDWA, and it also sought relief under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act and under state common-law theories of nuisance and nuisance
per se.98
The process of "[u]ranium mining involves the injection of oxygen and
bicarbonate into ore zones through injection wells to solubalize uranium,
which is then pumped to the surface through production wells."9 9 Under
SDWA regulations, "uranium injection wells are classified as Class III
wells, which are wells designed for the injection of materials for the extraction of ... minerals."1 00 Uranium mining is regulated by the TCEQ
under a grant of jurisdiction by the EPA, pursuant to the Underground
Injection Control (UIC) program of the SDWA.101 In contrast to mining,
uranium exploration is regulated by the Railroad Commission of Texas
(RRC) and is not subject to the SDWA. 102
UEC obtained a permit from the RRC for the exploratory boreholes it
drilled in the county. 103 The RRC issued UEC a notice of violation for
failure to properly plug the boreholes. 104 A number of residents of the
county thereafter complained that the water from their wells was polluted. UEC then filed a permit application with the TCEQ to allow UEC
to conduct in situ uranium mining. The County alleged that after the
UEC had contaminated the aquifer, it collected baseline water samples
that were included in its TCEQ application. In the suit, the County
sought to prohibit UEC from seeking a UIC permit from the TCEQ. At
the time the suit was filed, the TCEQ was in the midst of processing
UEC's permit application.10 5
UEC moved for dismissal, which the Southern District of Texas
granted, holding that the case was not ripe for adjudication and that the
County had failed to state a claim under the SDWA.10 6 First, the court
noted that in determining ripeness, it must consider "(1) whether delayed
96. Goliad County v. Uranium Energy Corp., No. V-08-18, 2009 WL 1586688, at *1
(S.D. Tex. June 5, 2009).
97. Id.
98. Id. at *4.
99. Id. at *1.
100. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 146.5(c)(2)).
101. Id. at *2 (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 27.001 et seq.).
102. Id. (citing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 131.001 et seq.).
103. Id. at *3.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *3.
106. Id. at *6.
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review would cause hardship to the plaintiff; (2) whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; and (3) whether the court would benefit from further factual
development of the issues presented."' 0 7 Under these criteria, the court
concluded that because UEC's permit application was still pending
before the TCEQ, and the agency had not decided whether to grant or
deny the application, the County's claims were not ripe for review. 0 8
Second, the court held that even if the case were ripe, the County failed
to properly allege a violation of the SDWA because UEC's alleged "conversion" of an exploratory well to an injection well was not subject to
regulation under the statute. 109 The court concluded that the definition
of "injection" and "injection activity" under SDWA regulations and case
law "requires, at a minimum, some action that either knowingly would
result in-or is designed to allow for-the funneling of fluid into a well,
and at a maximum, a calculated use of force designed to propel such fluid
into a well."' 10 "A purely unknowing and passive allowance, would not
... be sufficient to cause the 'injection' of some substance into the ground
or otherwise constitute an 'injection activity."'"1 Because the County
did not allege that UEC knowingly allowed storm water to enter the
boreholes, the court concluded that the County had failed to properly
allege facts sufficient to make the boreholes' injection wells subject to the
SDWA.112
The outcome of Goliad County is important for two reasons. First, it
confirms that courts are generally reluctant to decide cases when there is
an ongoing administrative process. Until that process is complete, the
uncertainty surrounding the agency's final action may render any judicial
suit unripe. Second, Goliad County suggests that in order to be subject to
the injection well provisions of the SDWA, an entity must have knowledge that its actions will result in underground injection. The mere potential for future contamination of an aquifer through a borehole or well
is not sufficient to establish the applicability of the SDWA.
VIII.

CONTRACT CLAIMS

A somewhat complicated case involving contract claims raises interesting questions as to what a permit applicant should ask for in a settlement
with a party disputing its permit application." 3 The complaining parties
were two brothers, J.E. and N.K. Hicks, who owned land adjacent to an
egg facility, operated by Pilgrim, which housed a million chickens. The
Hickses challenged Pilgrim's attempts to permit waste management prac107. Id. at *5 (citing Monk v. Huston, 340 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2003)).
108. Id. at *6.
109. Id. at *8.
110. Id. at *9.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Hicks v. Pilgrim Poultry, G.P., 299 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009,
no pet.).
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tices with the TCEQ. 114
An original settlement with the brothers allowed a specific approach to
managing the waste or wastewater, but the management method was not
cost-effective, so a second approach was proposed, and an amendment to
the first settlement was agreed upon by the parties (the Second Agreement). The Second Agreement included a payment to the Hickses of
$750,000, $50,000 in attorney's fees, and the creation of a $1 million escrow account to pay for corrective actions for odor problems. It also required the implementation of measures for odor control and compliance
with the conditions of the first agreement incorporated into the Second
Agreement. 115
The Hickses agreed to release all claims related to the permit applications and the first agreement, contingent upon operation of the new facility to address the wastewater management, and completing certain other
actions. In addition, the Hickses agreed to file a written request to withdraw any hearing request or objection to the relevant permit application,
and they agreed not to oppose the inclusion of the new method of managing the wastewater from the Pilgrim facility. 116
The action of Pilgrim after the settlement raised concerns by the
Hickses; however, they withdrew their objection to the permit, and the
TCEQ issued it. Subsequent to that action, "Pilgrim filed a request with
the TCEQ to amend the permit to change it to ... a registration in lieu of
a permit, to increase the number of birds at the facility by 138,715, to add
484 acres of on-site land application of waste or wastewater, and 1,023
acres of off-site land application, to make the use of treated wastewater
optional rather than mandatory, and to employ" the method previously
agreed by the parties.11 7
Thereafter, the Hickses filed a letter with the TCEQ reciting the prior
agreements with Pilgrim and objecting to several of the changes requested by Pilgrim, as well as requesting a contested case hearing on Pilgrim's request to the TCEQ. Pilgrim filed a declaratory judgment action
against the Hickses, asserting breach of the Second Agreement, to which
the Hickses counterclaimed for declaratory judgment that Pilgrim had
breached the Second Agreement. 11 8
The trial court submitted the question of the breach of contract to the
jury, which determined that the Hickses breached the Second Agreement
and owed Pilgrim $750,000.119 The trial court's judgment included
$174,000 in pre-judgment interest, $148,000 in attorney's fees, and court
costs against the Hickses.
On appeal, the Texarkana Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id. at 254.
Id.
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judgment. 120 The first issue, whether the contract was ambiguous, was for
the court to decide. 12 1 Pilgrim argued that the release was ambiguous
and that, although it was not specifically stated in the settlement, it prohibited the Hickses from complaining about events that occurred on the
facility prior to the signing of the Second Amendment. The court of appeals rejected this argument and determined that the release was not ambiguous and that it did not contain the prohibition argued by Pilgrim. 1 2 2
The court of appeals also ruled that where a contract is not ambiguous
and the facts are not disputed, it is error for the trial court to submit the
interpretation of the contract to the jury. 12 3 The language of the Second
Agreement specifically stated that it did not preclude filing complaints to
actions under the permit, filing complaints to actions in violation of the
permit, or filing hearing requests, objections, or complaints related to future applications for renewal, amendments, or other revisions. 124 Thus,
the court of appeals ruled that the Hickses did not breach the Second
Agreement in contesting the revision of the permit and Pilgrim's related
requests to the TCEQ, or in sending letters to other neighboring landowners about Pilgrim's activities. 125
Hicks illustrates how settlement agreements in lawsuits and permit appeals must be carefully drafted to consider future issues and actions by
complaining parties. Additionally, the case demonstrates how actions following such an agreement should be carefully considered by both settling
parties with respect to a potential breach of the settlement agreement.
Specifically, the abilities of the permitted facility to change its activities
and the ability of the neighboring landowner to raise complaints about
those activities have to be carefully negotiated and drafted.
IX. TORT CLAIMS
In DBMS Investments, L.P. v. ExxonMobil Corp., the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals considered whether the plaintiffs exercised the appropriate level of diligence to trigger application of the discovery rule and
thus toll the limitations period applicable to injury to soil and groundwater based on contamination. 12 6 Having filed the lawsuit sixteen years
after the alleged injury to the land occurred, the plaintiffs argued that
they "did not discover, and in the exercise of reasonable diligence could
not have discovered, the condition of the property, the wrongful acts of
Defendant, and the resultant injury until less than two years prior to the
filing of [the] lawsuit."1 27 Complicating the issue was the fact that one of
120. Id. at 261.
121. Id. at 255.
122. Id. at 258.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 260.
125. Id.
126. No. 13-08-00449-CV, 2009 WL 1974646, *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 11,
2009, pet. denied).
127. Id. at *2.
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the plaintiffs, DBMS, did not own the property at the time the alleged
injury occurred.
In its analysis, the court of appeals first addressed the circumstances
under which a subsequent property owner, here DBMS, can recover for
injury to property that occurred prior to the subsequent property owner's
ownership.1 28 The court of appeals recognized that under Texas law: (1)
the rights of action for damages resulting from injury to land accrue to
the owner at the time the cause of the injury begins to affect the land, (2)
the right to sue for injury is a personal right that belongs to the person
who owns the property at the time of the injury, and (3) a subsequent
purchaser can recover for that injury if an express provision in the deed,
129
or an assignment, grants the subsequent property owner that authority.
Next, the court of appeals addressed whether the discovery rule tolled
the applicable limitations period. Under the discovery rule, the accrual of
limitations may be tolled where "the nature of the injury is inherently
undiscoverable and evidence of the injury is objectively verifiable."1 30
Further, to determine whether an injury is inherently undiscoverable,
courts look to whether the type of injury-rather than the particular injury-was discoverable. 1 3 1 If the discovery rule does apply, "a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have discovered, the nature of his injury and the likelihood that it was caused by the wrongful acts of
another."1 32
To prove that the contamination was inherently undiscoverable, plaintiffs presented an environmental consultant's affidavit, liability assessment report, remedial action plan, and remediation cost estimate. The
consultant's affidavit stated that, based on his investigation, the contamination on the property, in all likelihood, emanated from the adjoining
property, formerly owned and operated by ExxonMobil, and was caused
by ExxonMobil sometime between 1985 and October 1990. Further, the
environmental consultant concluded that the contamination was inherently undiscoverable, because it could not be observed by visual inspection of the surface of the property, no public records would have put the
property owners on notice that the property was contaminated, and the
contamination was not discoverable through the exercise of reasonable
diligence. Included in the liability assessment report were aerial photographs of the property dating from 1979 through 2000 that showed waste
disposal pits/surface impoundment and petroleum storage tanks on the
adjacent property. The environmental consultant stated in the report
that, based on the direction of groundwater flow, the storage tanks appeared to be upgradient from a contaminated area of the property. A
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at *34.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *6.
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site location map included in the report also showed that a number of oil
wells surrounded the property. 133
ExxonMobil's evidence showing why the discovery rule should not apply-that is, because the contamination was not in fact "inherently undiscoverable"-included: (1) the plaintiffs' answers to ExxonMobil's
interrogatories, admitting that the plaintiffs knew the property was adjacent to a gas plant and that gas pipelines ran underneath the property, (2)
a real estate appraisal report prepared before DBMS acquired the property, observing that the property is located in an area of long-term, concentrated industrial use with accompanying environmental hazards, and
that such activities had a direct detrimental influence on the neighborhood, (3) statements in the real estate appraisal report recommending a
Phase I Environmental Site Assessment to evaluate obvious environmental impacts, (4) several letters and reports from the RRC documenting
remediation efforts on land surrounding the property, (5) documentation
of spills that had occurred in and around the property, and (6) an affidavit from the custodian of records of the Texas General Land Office
34
(GLO), stating that the spill reports were business records of the GLO.1
With all the information, the court of appeals determined that ExxonMobil's evidence largely undermined the conclusions of the plaintiffs'
environmental consultant that the contamination was inherently undiscoverable.1 35 The court of appeals highlighted the fact that though the
environmental consultant's conclusions claimed a lack of publicly available information about the contamination, the RRC, the TCEQ, and the
GLO all had records evidencing that oil and gas spills had occurred on
land adjacent to the property. 136 Further, the aerial photographs showed
that the property was near a gas plant, waste pits, and storage tanks. The
court of appeals concluded that this information demonstrated that the
plaintiffs should have inquired about the gas plant operations next
door.1 37
The court of appeals, in part, relied on the reasoning in HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel,138 which considered the level of diligence mineral interest owners should employ while protecting their interests against
neighboring operators. In Neel, the Texas Supreme Court found that
mineral interest owners should exercise "reasonable diligence in determining whether adjoining operators have inflicted damage."1 3 9 The supreme court further determined that "royalty owners cannot be oblivious
to the existence of other operators in the area of the existence of a common reservoir.'"140 The court of appeals came to a similar conclusion in
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at *7.
Id. at *8-9.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *10.
982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998).
Id. at 186.
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DBMS Investments, finding that-like the Neels-DBMS "could not ignore the surrounding operations nor the possibility that the operations
would cause contamination to the land."1 4 1 The court of appeals held
that a reasonably diligent landowner would have inquired about the operations on the adjacent property, and would have investigated the records
available at the GLO, TCEQ, and RRC before acquiring the property. 142
Thus, the contamination was not inherently undiscoverable, and the discovery rule could not be used to toll the limitations period applicable to
the claims of contamination. 1 4 3
This decision puts prospective property owners on notice that, before
acquiring a property, they should employ reasonable diligence. This may
include record searches at relevant agencies if the prospective purchasers
have knowledge of surrounding conditions that could adversely affect the
property.
In another case, the question of subsurface trespass raised issues regarding the ability to sue a party whose underground injection migrates
under another person's property without that person's permission or a
lease allowing use of the pore spaces under the property. 144 The facts
involved a nonhazardous wastewater injection well operated by Environmental Processing Systems (EPS) and the intersection of common-law
claims with administrative permitting. EPS held a permit issued by the
former Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) to
inject nonhazardous wastewater into the Frio saltwater formation. At issue was whether injected and migrating wastewater could be considered a
subsurface trespass when the injecting entity has a permit for such activity. FPL Farming claimed that it owned the portion of the Frio saltwater
formation and the groundwater within the formation underneath its property, and thus, any migration of EPS-injected wastewater into the subsurface of FPL Farming's property constituted a trespass. FPL Farming
raised objections to EPS's injection well at two contested case hearings.
One objection was resolved through settlement with EPS, while the other
was overruled when the TNRCC granted EPS's application to amend its
permits. This, however, was later affirmed by both the Travis County district court and the Austin Court of Appeals. 145
The TCEQ (then the TNRCC) authorizes wastewater injection wells
"for the benefit of the state and the preservation of its natural resources." 146 The Beaumont Court of Appeals compared the TCEQ's authorization at issue in this case to the RRC's authorization at issue in
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel, where the Texas Supreme
Court considered a claim for trespass in light of the RRC's issuance of
141. 2009 WL 1974646, at *10 n.11.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., 305 S.W.3d 739, 739-42 (Tex. App.Beaumont 2009, pet. filed).
145. Id. at 741-42.
146. Id. at 744 (quoting TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 27.011-.012).

2010]

Environmental Law

575

authorization for a secondary recovery operation that utilized saltwater
injection. 1 4 7 Relying on the reasoning put forth by the supreme court in
Manziel, the Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded that no trespass occurs under common law when the TCEQ has authorized deep subsurface
injections and the injected fluids later migrate into the deep subsurface of
nearby property.14 8 To support this conclusion, the court of appeals emphasized the agency's requisite consideration of multiple interests, one of
which may be the doctrine of common-law trespass. 149
The holding in FPL Farming reveals the challenges a landowner confronts in proving common law claims, such as trespass or nuisance, where
a regulatory agency has authority to authorize the activity that is allegedly causing the injury. Under recent case law, the landowner faces a
challenge in establishing actionable common law claims if a permit has
been issued authorizing the activity. However, the case also highlights
potential points of attack in such cases. For example, where an agency is
not required to take into account private interests, such as injuries to private property or other established common-law doctrines, a landowner
may be able to argue that authorization of the activity does not authorize
the particular injury. Where the public interest is also harmed by the
particular instance of the agency's exercise of authority, even where a
regulatory agency is required to consider the public interest as part of its
authorization, the landowner could attack the administrative decision by
arguing that the authorization violated the agency's duty to protect the
public interest.
X.

CONCLUSION

The summaries of these cases provide helpful precedents for future
counsel and can serve as "helpful guidance" for contract drafting. The
precedents further elucidate federal and state statute, and provide guidelines for future application to and counsel of regulated parties as they
attempt to comply with, and take action under, environmental statutes.

147. 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
148. Id.
149. FPL Farming, 305 S.W.3d at 744.
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